Recently there has been widespread discussion on the topic of maximizing squadron combat readiness, primarily through increasing the quantity and quality of the training provided to aircrew. These discussions have brought about numerous plans for improving training, ranging from simple measures to comprehensive programs like the Strike-Fighter Weapons and Tactics program. This article seeks to present some simple proposals that could prove exceptionally effective.
For those unfamiliar with the SFWT concept, a brief introduction is neccessary. It is a multi-stage program designed to lead new strike-fighter pilots from the Fleet Replacement Squadrons to the Division leader level. It standardizes training through a structured syllabus and the Strike Fighter Tactics Instructors (SFTI) that will conduct check flights at the end of each stage. The SFTI pilots will be trained at Top Gun and will work at the Weapons Schools at each base. They will not only be responsible for check flights, but will author and update a series of lectures and computer-based training aids used in the program. This program is long awaited, and is a sweeping change in the way the fleet conducts business, but there are still some basic training issues that are being overlooked. The ideas suggested here could improve training with only minor changes in the way we currently operate.
The number one impediment to training in fleet squadrons is lack of time. The training aids available right now are sufficient to provide valuable training, if there was any time in a JOs schedule to do some training. Even things as simple as opening a Tactical Manual and reading a few pages--the most basic type of training--are impossible when a department head is demanding to see evals, the XO is wondering where the latest command assessment survey results are, or the CO needs to see the lessons learned from the last detachment. Until there is some relief from the paperwork load, training will be relegated to a secondary role--there is no fitrep block that measures amount of training completed.
Since squadron tasking is not abating, the only answer is greater manning. This does not mean more pilots per squadron, that would adversely affect readiness by reducing the number of flight hours each pilot receives. The best solution is to place officers in each squadron dedicated to working on the administrative tasks that currently consume training time. This has begun to happen on a small scale; within the last year a billet was added to every fleet Hornet squadron for a assistant administration officer. There is plenty of room available on aircraft carriers for the extra personnel, considering that air wings are down to only one F-14 squadron, and that many have replaced their A-6 squadrons with F-18 squadrons.
This has been standard procedure in Air Force squadrons for some time. The junior officer pilots are assigned to the operations departments where they have little, if any, collateral duties. With a reduced paperwork load, they have more time to concentrate on tactics and training and become much more effective at operating the complex systems they control.
Another training issue is cycle length. While this is not usually looked at as a training issue, it certainly is one of the major factors in the training plan of deployed squadrons. There are several arguments on both sides of the cycle time issue, but training clearly favors shorter cycles. As cycle length increases, the amount of fuel carried must be increased. This results in increasing the weight and drag of aircraft through a completely untactical configuration and these configurations do not provide typical performance in a combat situation. As cycle lengths are shortened, aircraft can be configured much as they will be in actual combat situations--providing greater training--and they can execute maneuvers at realistic speeds. The only training available is done with the fuel an aircraft has above its ladder.
During a 1+40 cycle with no tanking, FA-18 aircraft are on their ladder off the catapult. This means that the fastest airspeed they will see during the cycle might be 300 knots (at least until they get to the break). If the aircraft they are training with are limited in a similar manner, pilots and controllers each get used to seeing "tactical" intercepts with approximately 550 knots of closure. Compare this to a possible real-world situation where each section might be doing 500 knots for a closure of 900-950 knots total. It is easy to see how the "max conserve AIC" is not only bad training it is negative training. If the aircrew could count on landing sooner, they would use the extra fuel getting quality training.
Some of the arguments against shorter cycles are reduced maintenance turn-around time and working the deck crews harder. These problems could be solved by placing more aircraft on the deck that need long turn-arounds and only use each aircraft every other cycle (remember that missing F-14 squadron?). The deck crew will assuredly work harder during the time the air wing is flying, but because the overall cycles are shorter, they will be on the deck for less time in the end. If it is impossible to shorten all cycles, compromises like occasional long cycles to allow for complex respots, or short cycles just at the beginning and end of the day are better than absolutely no training.
This leads directly to the next issue in maximizing training, cost-per-flight hour. This was originally designed as an easy to calculate measure of a squadron's efficiency. Unfortunately, it has absolutely zero value as a measure of squadron readiness or training. If it is accepted that squadrons with the highest readiness are the most efficient, then it even loses its original purpose as an efficiency measure. The Washington bean-counters that point to cost-per-flight hour and insist on meeting specific targets do not understand that this is not the way to get the most value from the taxpayers money.
If squadrons wanted to minimize cost-per-flight hour, they would launch, fly max conserve for 1+40, and land (sound familiar?), but obviously they would be woefully unprepared to enter any combat. On the other hand, the squadron that launches its aircraft on 1 hour flights during which they make liberal use of the afterburners and the airspeeds that would be common in a tactical situation will have a much greater cost-per-flight hour, but also be vastly more prepared for combat. Which situation is preferrable?
Though there are several more issues that could be discussed, the final topic of this paper is the use of expendables in training situations. While chaff dispensing can be simulated by a pilot punching a button or clicking a switch, there is no substitute for the person who is operating the radar that the chaff is working against. Without a live cloud of chaff to deceive the radar and cause false targets, then aircrew will not get the benefit of seeing it's effects, and practicing counter-techniques. The same is true for flares as pilots begin to use more complex IR missiles (AIM-9M -8) that require flares in the field-of-view for maximum training. The current minimal allowances for both chaff and flares in squadron budgets are very damaging to training.
The SFWT program is a giant leap forward for fleet training, but these are some small issues that can actually make an enormous effect on the quality of training aircrew receive. If the administrative load is not reduced, even the SFWT program will be ignored or gundecked as squadron officers spend all their time getting their ground jobs completed. Without the ability to train at tactical airspeeds with expendables, aircrew will be less proficient and the primary losers will be the taxpayers who get less for the money they spent to train them in the first place.